



*MAKING YORK A SAFER CITY*

**WORKING WITH INDIVIDUALS  
VULNERABLE TO EXTREMISM: CITY OF  
YORK PRACTICE GUIDANCE**

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# Working with Individuals Vulnerable to Extremism

## 1. Aims of the Guidance

There are 4 key aims to this guidance:

1. To signpost the reader to the most relevant **national guidance and strategies**
2. To provide advice on **understanding and recognising risks and vulnerabilities of radicalisation**
3. To provide clarity on the process that needs to be followed when a concern is identified, **NOTICE, CHECK and SHARE.**
4. To provide information on the **local arrangements** in place to support the workforce.

The guidance recognises that effective implementation will require a multi-agency and partnership approach

After reading the guidance, agencies need to ensure that Prevent and the Channel process are embedded within their organisations and the day to day practice of the multi-agency workforce. Agencies, in exercising their functions must have 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.'

The guidance recognises that effective implementation will require multi-agency and partnership arrangements. The Prevent Strategic Board (York & North Yorkshire) and Safer York Partnership provide the scrutiny and oversight of multi-agency arrangements.

## 2. National Guidance and Strategies

The UK faces a severe and continuing threat from international terrorism. The aim of **CONTEST** is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas. **CONTEST** as a counter-terrorism strategy is organised around four work streams, each comprising a number of key objectives:

- **PURSUE:** To stop terrorist attacks;

- **PREVENT:** To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- **PROTECT:** To strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and
- **PREPARE:** To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

The Prevent aspect of this guidance aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It contains three key objectives:

- **Ideology:** challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it;
- **Individuals:** protecting people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- **Institutions:** supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.

The focus of Prevent is on the threat posed by international terrorism and those in the UK who are inspired by it. But it is also concerned with reducing threats, risks and vulnerabilities posed by domestic extremists such as those from the far right, far left and extreme animal rights activists.

The following key documents have been produced by the Government:

**Revised Prevent Duty Guidance** (September 2015)

For England and Wales on the duty in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism

[www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance)

**The use of social media for online radicalisation** (July 2015)

Guide for schools on how terrorist groups such as ISIL use social media to encourage travel to Syria and Iraq.

[www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-use-of-social-media-for-online-radicalisation](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-use-of-social-media-for-online-radicalisation)

**A comprehensive Strategy to Defeat Extremism** (October 2015)

Counter-extremism strategy which aims to tackle the full spectrum of harms caused by extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi, hate and fear in all their forms.

[www.gov.uk/government/news/a-comprehensive-strategy-to-defeat-extremism](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-comprehensive-strategy-to-defeat-extremism)

### 3. Definitions

For the purpose of this guidance:

- **Extremism.** The Government has defined extremism in the *Prevent* strategy as: “Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces.”
- **Radicalisation** is a process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremism ideologies associated with terror groups. Radicalisation can be both violent and non-violent. Violent extremism is caused by a combination of interlocking factors:
  - An ideology which justifies terrorism by manipulating theology as well as history and politics
  - Radicalisers and their networks which promote violent extremism through a variety of places, institutions and media;
  - Individuals who are vulnerable to the messages of violent extremists;
  - Communities which are sometimes poorly equipped to challenge and resist extremism; and
  - Grievances, some genuine and some perceived, and some of course directed very specifically against government.

There are multiple pathways that constitute the process of radicalisation, which can be independent but are usually mutually reinforcing.

### 4. The risk of radicalisation and extremism in York

*Prevent* work is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The most significant of these threats is currently from terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq and Al Qa’ida associated groups. But terrorists associated with the extreme right also pose a continued threat to our safety and security.

Although it is tempting to consider York as being far removed from the threat of extremism and radicalisation, York is a major tourist city and a major rail network hub providing transport links directly to all many UK cities. York and North Yorkshire have some of the fastest growing minority communities in the UK and there is a lack of cohesion within some communities and undertones of increasing extreme right wing views.

The Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP) outlines the threat, risk and vulnerability from Terrorism for York and North Yorkshire. Local links to CTLP exist in York through the multi-agency Local Prevent Delivery Group. Further information can be found on the Safer York Partnership website [www.saferyorkpartnership.co.uk](http://www.saferyorkpartnership.co.uk)

## **5. Prevent Duty**

From 1<sup>st</sup> July 2015 many public facing organisations providing services to children, young people and adults are subject to a duty under Section 26 of the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. This duty is known as the Prevent Duty and the Government’s guidance specifies those authorities responsible for the duty)

[www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance)

It is essential that staff within agencies and organisations that provide services to children, young people and adults are able to identify individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and know what to do when they are identified.

Protecting individuals from the risk of radicalisation is an integral part of safeguarding duties and is similar in nature to protecting children and adults from other harms (eg. Drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation) whether these come from within their family or are the product of outside influences.

## **6. Prevent Governance for York**

In response to the Prevent Strategy 2011, a multi-agency Prevent Partnership Board (Formerly the Prevent Implementation Board) was established. Representation on this board is at a Chief Officer level from the specified authorities and is currently chaired by the Chief Executive of a North Yorkshire District Council. The delivery arms for this board are the multi-agency Local Prevent Groups (formerly known as Bronze groups) which are based in each local authority area. Strategic overview for Prevent in York is held by the Safer York Partnership Board. Through this board, there is connectivity to the local safeguarding boards (adults and children).

## **7. Ensuring appropriate arrangements are in place**

In ensuring that the specified authorities are fulfilling their requirements as outlined under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, all agencies

should ensure they have in place adequate arrangements to safeguard individuals from extremism and radicalisation. This includes:

- Clear leadership and accountable structures
- Appropriate training for both staff and management
- Processes to ensure that cases are referred and managed effectively
- Systems that help individuals against extremism and support individuals from being radicalised

Each organisation should have an established single point of contact (SPOC) identified as the strategic lead for Prevent although all senior leadership needs to be aware of the Prevent agenda and their organisation's strategy to address this. Within City of York Council, the SPOC is Head of Community Safety (Contact details provided at the end of this document).

The Prevent agenda and its associated practices need to be embedded within existing policies and procedures and everyday practice. These should be well communicated within the organisation and all staff need to be aware of the role they play to safeguard individuals.

**Appendix 1** provides a self-assessment toolkit to assist organisations to carry out a self-assessment of their arrangements to safeguard individuals from extremism and radicalisation. This tool can also provide suitable evidence for both internal and external audits and inspections such as Ofsted.

## **8. Understanding and Recognising the Risks and Vulnerabilities of Radicalisation**

There is no obvious profile of an individual likely to become involved in extremism or a single indicator of when an individual might move to adopt violence in support of extremist ideas. Examples of extremist causes that have used violence to achieve their aims include animal rights, the far right, internal terrorist and international terrorist organisations.

An individual can be drawn to radicalisation at any age. The process of radicalisation is different for every individual and can take place over an extended period of within a very short time frame.

Individuals can be drawn into violence or they can be exposed to the messages of extremist groups by many means. These can include the influence of:

- Family members
- Friends
- Direct contact with extremist groups and organisations, or
- Via the internet, TV and media

The vulnerability factors highlighted below make some individuals vulnerable to radicalisation (but it cannot be assumed that they apply to everyone). Key questions for practitioners to consider when they have concerns have also been included.

Area	Vulnerability	Key questions for consideration
Personal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A sense of isolation</li> <li>• Adolescence</li> <li>• Low self-esteem</li> <li>• Driven by the desire for 'adventure' and excitement</li> <li>• Unmet aspirations such as perception of injustice or feeling of failure</li> <li>• Rejection of civic life</li> <li>• Experience of poverty, disadvantage of social exclusion</li> <li>• Searching for answers to questions about identity, faith and belonging</li> <li>• Special educational need – difficulties with social interaction, empathy with others, understanding the consequences of their actions and awareness of the motivations of others</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has there been a significant shift in the individuals behaviour or outward appearance that suggests a new social/political or religious influence</li> <li>• Does the individual vocally support terrorist attacks; either verbally or in their written work?</li> <li>• Does the individual have any marks, scars or tattoos which are linked to extremist groups?</li> </ul>
Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family tensions</li> <li>• Conflict with family over religious beliefs, lifestyle choices or extreme political views</li> <li>• Rejection by family</li> <li>• Perceived need to 'avenge' the alleged victimisation/persecution of a family member/significant other (<i>or similar</i>)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the individual come into conflict with family over religious beliefs/lifestyle/dress choices?</li> </ul>
Religion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recent religious conversion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the individual witnessed or been the</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity confusion – eg. Distance from cultural/religious heritage and uncomfortable with their place in the society around them</li> <li>• Rejection by faith groups</li> </ul>	<p>perpetrator/victim of racial or religious hate crime or sectarianism?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the individual come into conflict with family over religious beliefs/lifestyle/dress choices?</li> </ul>
Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A traumatic or series of traumatic events – both personal or national</li> <li>• Victim or witness to race or religious hate crime</li> <li>• Uncensored access to extremist propaganda</li> <li>• Influenced by world events and a sense of grievance resulting in a need to make a difference</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have international events in areas of conflict and civil unrest had a personal impact on the individual resulting in a noticeable change in behaviour?</li> <li>• It is important to recognise that many people may be emotionally affected by the plight of what is happening in areas of conflict (ie images of children dying) it is important to differentiate them from those that sympathise with or support extremist activity</li> <li>• Is there a pattern of regular or extended travel within the UK, with other evidence to suggest this is for the purposes of extremist training or activity?</li> </ul>
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rejection by social group</li> <li>• Drawn to a group or individual who can offer identity, social network and support</li> <li>• Pressure from peers associated with extremism</li> <li>• Disassociating from existing friendship group and becoming involved with a new and different group of friends</li> <li>• Driven by a need to raise self-esteem and promote 'street cred'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the individual person frequent, or is there evidence to suggest that they are accessing the internet for the purpose of extremist activity? (eg. Use of closed network groups, access to or distribution of extremist material, contact associates covertly via Skype/email etc)</li> <li>• Does the individual support groups with links to extremist activity but not illegal/illicit eg propaganda distribution, fundraising and attendance at meetings?</li> <li>• Does the individual have experience of poverty, disadvantage, discrimination or social exclusion?</li> </ul>

Criminality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Experiences of imprisonment</li> <li>• Poor resettlement/reintegration</li> <li>• Previous involvement with criminal groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the individual joined an extremist organisation?</li> <li>• Is the individual known to have possessed or is actively seeking to possess and/or distribute extremist literature/other media material likely to incite racial/religious hatred or acts of violence</li> </ul>
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Current information on extremist symbols and logos can be found on the following websites:

- Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation (CoPPRa) website  
[www.coppra.eu/pocketguide](http://www.coppra.eu/pocketguide)
- Anti-defamation League at [www.adl.org](http://www.adl.org)

It is key to note that the above is not an exhaustive list and further information and clarity may be needed. Some individuals with care and support needs may be at a higher risk and could be targeted by some groups. The care and support needs may include a physical disability; mental health needs; increased social isolation or vulnerability to coercion.

Professional judgement and proportionality is needed to ensure individual concerns are assessed, escalated and recorded appropriately. This may involve advice and support from your organisation's SPOC and other multi-agency colleagues.

## 9. Internal and External Influences

An individual may be drawn to extremism either by single or multiple methods including

METHOD	HOW?
Online	<p>The internet provides entertainment, connectivity and interaction. Individuals may need to spend a lot of time on the internet while studying as well as use social media and messaging sites such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Vine or Whatsapp</p> <p>The power and scope of the internet and social media must be recognised and networks use this media to reach out to people and can communicate extremist messages</p>
Peer interaction	<p>Individuals at risk may display extrovert behaviour, children and young people start getting into trouble at school, college or on the streets and mixing with others who are already involved with anti-social or criminal behaviour. However this is not always the case.</p> <p>Sometimes those at risk may be encouraged, by the people they are in contact with, not to draw attention to themselves. As part of some forms of radicalisation, family members, friends, parents and professionals may feel their child's/relative's behaviour seems to be improving. For example, children may become quieter and more serious about their studies; young people and adults may dress more modestly and mix with a group of people who seem to be better behaved than their previous friends.</p>
TV & Media	<p>The media provides a view on world affairs. However, this is often a very simple version of events which are in reality very complex. Individuals may not understand the situation fully or appreciate the dangers involved in the views of some groups.</p>

It is important to note that the presence of one or more risk factors will not necessarily lead to radicalisation or engagement in violent activity and every case will need to be considered on an individual basis. Likewise, the level of intervention needs to be proportionate to the level of risk to the individual perceived by professionals.

Early intervention is vital and staff must be aware of the established processes for front line professionals to refer concerns about individuals and/or groups. Professionals must have:

- The confidence to challenge
- The confidence to intervene and
- Ensure that strong safeguarding practices based on the most up-to-date guidance and best practice are followed.

## **10. Prevent Case Study**

When he was 19, Andrew Ibrahim was arrested on suspicion of plotting to detonate a series of devices in a Bristol shopping mall. At the time, his home was found to contain explosive devices, extremist material and a suicide vest.

Andrew was the son of an English mother and Egyptian father and from a young age he struggled to find his identity. He actively sought acceptance at school but this was perceived as attention seeking. As a result, he was rejected by his peer group. Although he was intelligent, Andrew did not focus on his studies. Instead, he played truant and got himself into trouble which resulted in his expulsion from several schools.

Andrew began experimenting with drugs aged 13 and this quickly escalated into heroin use by the time he was 16. He converted to Islam and his family were optimistic due to the positive changes in his behaviour. However, he quickly became reclusive and after listening to recordings of radical clerics and accessing extremist material on the internet, he developed a “mindset of martyrdom”.

He became forceful with his views and would not listen to other people’s opinions, particularly when it came to religion and politics related to the Middle East. He downloaded videos of experiments with explosives along with films of suicide bombers and Al Qa’ida propaganda films.


At college, he once asked a visiting lecturer in microbiology about the ‘best’ bacteria to kill people with. His use of drugs caused family relations to strain and he descended into poverty, choosing to become homeless aged 18.

With the help of a housing group, he was able to get hostel accommodation. It was noted that he appeared to be a devout Muslim but he would lapse into western clothes during times of drug misuse.

Andrew had been placed on a methadone programme and had shown his drug counsellor violent video footage that he had downloaded onto his mobile phone. After his trials with explosives went wrong, he went to a drop-in clinic seeking medical help for his injuries to his hands. He later met a friend at a mosque to whom he showed injuries to his feet that he had not revealed at the clinic. It was the local Muslim community who contacted the Police and Andrew was then provided with the support needed to address his issues.

## 10. Reducing the risk of Radicalisation and Extremism

**The Prevent Pyramid** (based on the former Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) model) highlights the different levels of vulnerability.



**Level 1: Universal needs:** This is the ‘wider community’ and represents how universal services work to reduce the risk of radicalisation and extremist behaviour, for example educational settings (*this would cover a wider range from 5 – 25 years*) building “pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views. Responses could include curriculum provision, additional tutoring or mentoring, additional activities within and out of educational setting and family support.

**Level 2: Early help and intervention:** This is a far larger group that constitutes all those individuals who are considered ‘vulnerable’ to being influenced by these messages. Where there is a higher level of concern, a multi-agency response is appropriate. Where concerns are identified in respect of potential signs of radicalisation, this needs to be discussed with the SPOC and a decision should be made on the most effective course of action. Services currently involved in the case may be able to manage the concerns or a case panel may be convened to determine a specific plan of action. Any referral to the SPOC must show a concern that an individual is vulnerable to radicalisation. To support this process, professionals may wish to refer to the Vulnerable Assessment Framework (see section on Channel Process).

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf)

**Level 3: Moving towards extremism:** These require specialist intervention. While not committing any violent acts themselves, they may provide support to those engaged in criminal activities and act to inspire or groom others.

Where there is an identified risk/potential that an individual may be involved/potentially involved in supporting or following extremism, further investigation by the police will be required prior to other assessments and interventions.

Any professional who identifies such concerns, for example, as a result of observed behaviour or reports of conversations to suggest the individual supports terrorism and/or extremism, must follow the safeguarding referral process and discuss with their SPOC.

Professionals should exercise professional judgement and common sense to identify whether an emergency situation applies. Examples in relation to extremism are expected to be very rare but would apply when there is information that a violent act is imminent or where weapons or other materials may be in the possession of an individual, another member of the family or within their community. **In this situation, a 999 call should be made.**

**Level 4: Actively breaking the law:** These remain relatively few in number when considered in relation to all those who may sympathise with their beliefs and feelings.

## **11. Referral and Intervention Process**

Safeguarding individuals with care and support needs from radicalisation is no different from safeguarding them from other forms of harm. In a few cases the concerns around an individual may go beyond being vulnerable to extremism.

Where a professional has identified the need to refer an individual, the relevant safeguarding procedures should be followed to ensure that an appropriate referral is made to Children's or Adult Social Care services in an effective and timely way. It is likely that this will be more straightforward in relation to children and young people as the thresholds for Adult services may not necessarily constitute a formalised safeguarding response. Referrals made to Social Care teams under the Prevent

agenda, should then be notified to the SPOC to ensure that a) referrals are logged and then progressed through any appropriate existing process or b) referrals are logged and picked up by the Community Safety Unit for multi-agency action. If the subject of the referral is not subject to any social care support, a multi-agency meeting will be convened by the Community Safety Unit to discuss a plan of action. Periodically referrals are made directly to the Community Safety Unit. In these instances the Community Safety Manager (Neighbourhoods) will check with Social Care teams whether the subject is known and/or whether any existing care packages are in place (in adult social care, these checks should be made with the Safeguarding Adults duty worker in the first instance). It is advised that services record referrals within their own data systems pending the development of greater synergy between databases held across the local authority and/or shared systems with partners eg. The Police

## **12. Channel Process**

'Channel' is the name for the multi-agency process of identifying and referring a person for early intervention and support for those at risk of radicalisation. It is a key element of the Prevent strategy. The Channel process uses existing collaboration between local authorities (education, community safety, social care teams etc), statutory partners (health, offender management services, police) and the local community to:

- Identify people at risk of being drawn into terrorism;
- Assess the nature and extent of that risk; and
- Develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned

For further information on Channel:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance>

York has an established Channel Panel comprised of core members from a range of partner agencies. The Panel meets on a monthly basis. The document **Channel Referral Process** which accompanies this guidance outlines the referral process in detail. Referrals are assessed by North Yorkshire Police and recommended to Channel Panel if they meet the Channel criteria. An initial information gathering takes place whereby agencies are asked to provide information relating to their contact with the individual who is subject to the referral. This allows the Panel to make an informed decision as to the suitability of the referral for the Channel process.

Channel Panel will collectively assess the risk and decide whether the person:

- Is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and therefore appropriate for the Channel process
- Should be referred to a different support mechanism; or
- Should exit the process

For those adopted as 'Channel' the Panel will develop an appropriate support package based on assessment of their vulnerability of being drawn into radicalisation.

Channel assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied framework (The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)) based on three dimensions:

- **Engagement** with a group, cause or ideology;
- **Intent** to cause harm; and
- **Capability** to cause harm

The Channel Panel must compliment existing safeguarding processes that may already be working with the individual eg Child or Adult safeguarding meetings, Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC).

The type of activities involved in the support package will depend on the risk, vulnerability and local resources. A diversionary activity may be sufficient for someone who is in the early stages of radicalisation to violence, whereas a more focused and structured one-on-one mentoring programme may be required for those already radicalised. Once an individual has been accepted on to Channel they must be made aware that the intervention/action cannot take place without their consent. In the case of a child, there may be certain circumstances where a parent/carer does not give their consent for their child to be supported, particularly if some of the vulnerabilities present are in the home environment. If the child is thought to be at risk of significant harm (Children Act 1989) Children's Social Care must be involved in decisions about that child.

If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed, they should recommend that the case exits the process. A closing report should be completed by the Chair, setting out the evidence for the panel's decision.

All cases should be reviewed at 6 and 12 months from the point at which they exit the process. All decisions and actions must be fully recorded by all agencies involved.

One of the options for support available through the Channel process would be a referral to a specialist intervention provider. A list of approved providers is maintained and funded by the Home Office.

### **13. Training and Resources**

Organisations should make sure that staff have training that gives them the knowledge and confidence to identify individuals at risk of being drawn into radicalisation, to challenge extremist ideas which can be used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. They should know where and how to refer those vulnerable to extremism for further help. Prevent awareness training will be a key part of this.

A number of national resources are available:

#### **Channel eLearning**

The National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ) in conjunction with the College of Policing, has developed a general awareness e-learning package for Channel. The package includes information on how Channel links to the Government's Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) through the Prevent Strategy guidance on how to identify people who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and how to refer them into the Channel process.

Case studies are included to increase the understanding of Channel which consist of identifying and referring vulnerable individuals to the process. Additionally, information is provided on how to identify appropriate support for the individual concerned. The training can be accessed via the following URL:

[http://course.ncalt.com/channel\\_General\\_Awareness/01/index.html](http://course.ncalt.com/channel_General_Awareness/01/index.html)

This e-learning has been developed by HM Government following consultation with a range of individuals and organisations. It has benefitted from the feedback of teachers, local authority officials, community-based groups, youth workers and many others. It offers an introduction to the Prevent duty, and explains how it aims to safeguard vulnerable people from being radicalised to supporting terrorism or becoming terrorists themselves.

<https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk>

### **Useful Guidance**

Further information regarding the Prevent Duty and Channel Guidance can be accessed via the Home Office website. This includes sector specific guidance. Some links are listed below:

Prevent Duty Guidance:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>

Channel Duty Guidance:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance>

Prevent Duty Schools:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty>

### **Websites aimed at the public, wider communities, businesses and womens groups**

[www.preventtragedies.co.uk](http://www.preventtragedies.co.uk) This website was created because of the increasing concern about growing numbers of young people who are putting themselves at risk travelling to Syria and other conflict zones and to help the families that have been torn apart by fear when their loved ones travel.

[www.ltai.info](http://www.ltai.info) Let's talk about it – An initiative designed to provide practical help and guidance to the public in order to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

[www.nactso.gov.uk](http://www.nactso.gov.uk) National Counter Terrorism Security Office OCTSO offers security advice for business with regard to protective security for buildings, crowded places and cyber security

### **Education Resources/Training**

[www.safercampuscommunities.ac.uk](http://www.safercampuscommunities.ac.uk) Higher education site dedicated to preventing violent extremism and radicalisation. Promoting Community cohesion, inter-faith relations and the sharing of good practice.

[www.157group.co.uk](http://www.157group.co.uk) Forward thinking member organisation which represents 26 leading UK Colleges and College Groups

[www.educateagainsthate.com](http://www.educateagainsthate.com) Guidance resources for schools

**City of York Council Prevent Lead:**

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01904 555742/07984496352

All correspondence on Prevent matters should be sent to:

[preventenquiries@york.gov.uk](mailto:preventenquiries@york.gov.uk) Emails to this address are monitored by the Community Safety Hub and will receive immediate attention